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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit challenged precedent in the areas of
search and seizure and sentence enhancement. In an en bane opinion,
United States v. Abreu, I the Tenth Circuit rejected the reasoning adhered
to by six other circuits concerning the application of a sentence en-
hancement provision. In a panel decision, United States v. Green,2 the
Tenth Circuit reached the opposite result in applying a similar provi-
sion. In United States v. Ward,3 the court refused to extend a Supreme
Court ruling concerning the constitutionality of random bus searches to
the setting of private train compartments.
This Survey examines the Abreu and Green opinions and the discrep-
ancy between them. The Tenth Circuit's sentence enhancement doc-
trine is unclear because the two opinions cannot be reconciled. This
Survey also analyzes the Ward opinion, which sets forth the Tenth Cir-
cuit's current search and seizure doctrine. An examination of the Tenth
Circuit's independence in these areas defines current Tenth Circuit
criminal procedure jurisprudence.
II. APPLICABILITY OF SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT PROVISIONS
A. Background-United States v. Abreu
Sentence enhancement involves the imposition of a greater sen-
tence upon a defendant who has previously been convicted of criminal
wrongdoing. It is a common feature of the federal and state criminal
justice systems. 4 The Constitution permits sentence enhancement for a
subsequent offense, contingent upon the validity of the prior conviction.
The justifications for sentence enhancement include deterrence, inca-
pacitation and the view that recidivists, or repeat offenders, are more
culpable than first-time offenders. 5
The sentence enhancement provision at issue in Abreu was 18 U.S.C.
section 924(c).6 Although described as a sentence enhancement provi-
sion in Simpson v. United States,7 the Supreme Court held this statute cre-
ates an offense distinct from the underlying felony rather than merely
1. 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
2. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 435 (1992).
3. 961 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992).
4. D. Brian King, Note, Sentence Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior Convictions,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1989).
5. Id. at 1373-74.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988). Congress passed § 924(c), an amendment to the Gun
Control Act of 1968, on October 22, 1968. The Gun Control Act of 1968 was part of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543,
1545-46 n.6 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987).
7. 435 U.S. 6, 10 (1978) (superseded by 1984 amendment to § 924(c)).
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enhancing the sentence.8 The second offense under section 924(c) is a
distinct crime which carries a-heavier penalty. 9
Congress adopted this amendment following the assassinations of
John and Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King,Jr.10 It provided
an additional sentence of five years for anyone convicted of using a fire-
arm in a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. I In the event of a
subsequent conviction under section 924(c), the statute provides an ad-
ditional sentence of twenty years. 12 The sponsor of the amendment
stated the purpose of this amendment was to persuade would-be felons
to leave their guns at home.' 3 Deterrence was of primary concern to
the legislators. They stressed that a criminal who used a gun to commit
a crime, and is convicted, will go to jail for a specific number of years.
Courts did not have discretion in sentencing. For the deterrent to be
effective, the criminal must know "he cannot beat the rap".' 4
In Simpson v. United States '5 and Busic v. United States, 16 the Supreme
Court addressed whether Congress intended section 924(c) to apply
when the predicate felony statute had its own enhancement provision.
The Court held it did not; sentences could not be enhanced twice. 17 In
response, Congress amended section 924(c) to clarify that it did author-
ize an enhanced sentence in addition to any enhancement provided by
the underlying felony statute.' 8
In applying section 924(c), questions arose over the nature of the
second offense required to trigger the 20-year enhancement provision.
In United States v. Rawlings,19 the defendant was convicted of two counts
of bank robbery and of using a gun in connection with each count in
8. Id. at 10.
9. Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415, 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 620 (1922).
10. Rawlings, 821 F.2d at 1545-46 n.6.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides in pertinent part:
(c) (1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffick-
ing crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides
for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five
years .... In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such
person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years .... (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. "Any such person should understand that if he uses his gun and is caught and
convicted, he is going to jail. He should further understand that if he does so a second
time, he is going to jail for a longer time." 114 CONG. REC. 22,231 (daily ed. July 19,
1968)(statement of Rep. Poff). Representative Rogers agreed: "(Any person who com-
mits a crime and uses a gun will know that he cannot get out of serving a penalty in jail.
And if he does it a second time, there will be a stronger penalty." Id. at 22,237.
14. Id. at 22,243 (statement of Rep. Latta).
15. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
16. 446 U.S. 398 (1980) (superseded by 1984 amendment to § 924(c)).
17. Busic, 446 U.S. at 404; Simpson, 435 U.S. at 16.
18. Congress affected this change by including within § 924(c) the parenthetical: "(in-
cluding a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced pun-
ishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device)." 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1988). See United States v. Lanzi, 933 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. 821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 70:4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
violation of section 924(c). 20 The district court held that the conviction
of the second section 924(c) count triggered the enhanced penalty pro-
vision, regardless of the fact both counts were charged in the same in-
dictment. 2 1 On appeal, Rawlings asserted that the statute required
conviction and sentencing under two separate indictments before the
enhanced penalty provision applied.
2 2
The Eleventh Circuit, on rehearing en banc, relied on its independ-
ent reading to determine the statute's applicability. 23 Giving full effect
to each provision of the statute, and assuming Congress used the words
as they are commonly and ordinarily understood, 24 the court pointed
out that the legislature chose to use the broad phrase "second or subse-
quent conviction." 25  Subsequent meant "following in time, order, or
place," while second only meant "one more after the first." 26 The court
concluded that a second conviction under section 924(c), "even though
in the same indictment as his first conviction, legitimately triggers the
enhancement provision."
27
The Rawlings court noted that had Congress intended to narrow the
provision, it could have done so explicitly. 2 8 The court cited the special
offender statute29 as an example. The statute defined a special offender
as a person convicted of two or more offenses and imprisoned for at
least one of those convictions within five years of the current offense.
30
In contrast, in section 924(c) Congress included none of the restric-
tions of the special offender statute.3 1 In addition, the defendant's argu-
ments were inconsistent with the broad purpose of the provision.
Congress intended to severely punish those who commit violent crimes
with firearms. Prosecutors could satisfy the separate indictment require-
ment merely by charging offenses in separate indictments, "thereby en-
suring that one of the convictions would occur later in time than the
other."3 2 The court concluded: "We do not think Congress intended
the enhanced penalty for a repeat offender of section 924(c) to hinge on
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1545.
22. Id. at 1546.





28. Id. at 1546.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section if - (1) the defend-
ant has previously been convicted in courts of the United States . . .for two or
more offenses committed on occasions different from one another and from such
felony and punishable in such courts by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year,for one or more of such convictions the defendant has been imprisoned prior to the com-
mission of such felony, and less than five years have elapsed between the commission
of such felony and either the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from
imprisonment .... (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Rawlings, 821 F.2d at 1546.
32. Id.
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the machinations of the prosecutor."3 3
Since the Rawlings decision, five other circuits3 4 have adopted its
reasoning and held that a second conviction under section 924(c), even
though charged in the same indictment as the first, legitimately triggers
the enhancement provision of section 924(c).3 5 In United States v.
Abreu,36 the Tenth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, disagreed. Rather than
phrasing the issue as whether section 924(c) required separate indict-
ments, the court focused on whether the statute required that the of-
fenses be separated by an intervening conviction. The court concluded
that an enhanced sentence applies only when the underlying offense was
committed after a judgment of conviction on the prior section 924(c)
offense.
3 7
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. United States v. Abreu 8
The prosecution. charged Orestes Abreu in one indictment with
drug and conspiracy offenses and four counts of using a firearm in con-
nection with each offense in violation of section 924(c)(1).3 9 Following
conviction on all counts, the trial court sentenced Abreu on the drug
and conspiracy charges and two of the section 924(c) charges.40 The
sentence for the second section 924(c) conviction was enhanced pursu-
ant to the provisions of that statute.
4 '
In a companion case, the prosecution charged James Thornbrugh in
one indictment with three counts of bank robbery, with each robbery
occurring on a separate date, and three section 924(c) counts, one for
each of the alleged bank robbery offenses. 42 Thornbrugh was convicted
of all the charges and received enhanced sentences for the second and
third section 924(c) convictions.
43
On appeal, both defendants questioned the propriety of their en-
hanced sentences under section 924(c). The Tenth Circuit ordered re-
hearing en banc to consider the lower court's interpretation of the
enhancement provision of this statute.4 4 In a 7-3 decision, the court
found the text of the statute and legislative history to be ambiguous with
33. Id.
34. United States v. Bernier, 954 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, (June 29,
1992); United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nabors, 901
F.2d 1351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 192 (1990); United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d
189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 534 (1990); United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 112 (1990).
35. Rawlings, 821'F.2d at 1545.
36. 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 1453-54.
38. 962 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992).








respect to the intended definition of "second or subsequent convic-
tion." 45 Hence, the court held that an enhanced sentence under section
924(c) for a second or subsequent conviction could not be imposed "un-
less the offense underlying this conviction took place after ajudgment of
conviction had been entered on the prior offense." 4 6 Accordingly, the
court reversed the enhanced sentences and remanded the cases for
resentencing.
a. Majority Opinion
Judge Seymour, writing for the majority, ruled that the phrase "sec-
ond or subsequent conviction" was ambiguous because it was subject to
more than one definition. 4 7 The majority found the legislative history
ambiguous as well. 4 8 Statements made by Representatives, which re-
ferred to severe penalties for offenders who use guns and 'even more
severe penalties for second offenders, did not compel a particular inter-
pretation of "second or subsequent conviction."
'49
Given the ambiguity, the majority applied rules of statutory con-
struction, specifically the rule of lenity.5 0 The rule requires strict con-
struction "to avoid and protect against unintended applications. s"5 ' The
Supreme Court in Ladner v. United States5 2 stated that courts may not
interpret statutes "so as to increase the penalty that it places on an indi-
vidual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a
guess as to what Congress intended."
5 3
The majority examined other enhancement provisions for gui-
dance. 54 Many statutes require enhancement when a second offense is
committed after a prior conviction.5 5 In particular, the court pointed to
21 U.S.C. section 962(b), which states, "a person shall be considered
convicted of a second or subsequent offense if, prior to the commission
of such offense, one or more prior convictions of him for a felony ...
have become final." '56 The court noted the government failed to iden-
tify any federal enhancement statute that did not require a prior convic-
45. Id. at 1450.
46. Id. at 1453.
47. Id. at 1449-50.
48. Id. at 1450.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1451.
51. Id. (citing Rogers v. United States, 325 F.2d 485, 487 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds and remanded for resentencing, 378 U.S. 549 (1964)).
52. 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
53. Id. at 178.
54. Abreu, 962 F.2d at 1451. In ascertaining congressional intent, the Supreme Court
has indicated that reference to other statutes may be appropriate. See, e.g., United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 534-44 (1940).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982) (special offender statute); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)
(commission of drug crime after prior drug conviction), 844(a) (simple possession of
drugs after two or more prior convictions), 845(a) (engaging in continuing criminal enter-
prise after prior conviction), 859(b) (distributing drugs to minor after prior conviction),
860(b) (distributing or manufacturing drugs near a school after prior conviction), 861 (c)
(employing minors to violate drug laws after prior conviction) (1988 & Supp. IIl 1992).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 962(b) (1988).
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tion before a sentence could be enhanced.5 7
The majority asserted that the government's interpretation of sec-
tion 924(c) defeated the legislative purpose behind subsequent offense
statutes. 58 "Reformation and retribution theories of punishment are
the primary reasons for imposing greater penalties on the repeater."5 9
Drafted as a deterrent, the statute made clear that a second offender,
who apparently had not learned from the initial penalty, would receive
more severe treatment.6 ° The majority maintained that until the initial
penalty has had an opportunity to effect the desired reformation, a sub-
sequent offense statute may not be applied to that offender. 6 ' There-
fore, as neither Abreu or Thornbrugh had the opportunity to learn from
their mistakes, their sentences should not have been enhanced.
b. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent accused the majority of rewriting section 924(c) to in-
clude limitations not specified by Congress. 62 The dissent found the
analysis employed by the other six circuits that addressed this issue per-
suasive. 6 3 The dissent argued that the plain meaning of the statute sup-
ported the conclusion that a second firearms conviction, even if charged
in the same indictment, gave rise to an enhanced sentence. 64
The dissent asserted that the majority's application of the rule of
lenity was unwarranted. 6 5 A statute was not ambiguous "for purposes
of lenity merely because it [is] possible to articulate a construction more
narrow than that urged by the Government."'6 6 Six other circuits found
the statute unambiguous. 6 7 The dissent pointed out that the rule of len-
ity is reserved "for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists
about a statute's intended scope."'6 8 Consequently, the majority placed
premature emphasis on the rule of lenity as lenity applies only "at the
end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at
the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to
wrongdoers."
69
Finally, the dissent echoed the concern expressed by the other cir-
cuits over inefficient prosecution. Requiring the second or subsequent
conviction to be the result of a separate indictment will do nothing more
than require prosecutors to charge repeat offenders in separate indict-




61. Id. at 1452-53.
62. Id. at 1454 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (Judges Tacha and Baldock joined Judge
Brorby in dissent).
63. Id. at 1454-55.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1455.
66. Id. (citing Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 461, 465 (1990)).
67. Id. at 1454. See supra note 33 and sources cited therein.
68. Abreu, 962 F.2d at 1455 (citing Moskal, 111 S.Ct. at 465).




ments. 70 Accordingly, the dissent maintained that the only legitimate
interpretation of section 924(c) allowed a second or subsequent convic-
tion charged in the same indictment as the first to trigger the enhance-
ment provisions of that statute.
7'
Surprisingly, neither the Abreu majority nor dissent referred to
United States v. Tisdale 7 or United States v. Bolton. 73 Those cases involved
the interpretation of a similar sentence enhancement provision, in which
the Tenth Circuit held intervening convictions were not a prerequisite
to sentence enhancement.
C. Background-U.S. v. Green
The sentence enhancement statute at issue in United States v. Green 
74
was 18 U.S.C. section 924(e), 7 5 an amendment to the Armed Career
Criminal Act (Career Criminal Act). The amendment provided that a
convicted felon who possesses, receives or transports a firearm in inter-
state commerce may be fined up to $25,000 and shall be imprisoned not
less than fifteen years. 76 Congress aimed the amendment at career
criminals-for example, burglars and robbers who make up "one person
crime waves."
77
The original theory behind the amendment was that once the career
criminal became a "three-time loser"-acquired three previous convic-
tions-the only reasonable solution required permanent incarcera-
tion. 78 Subsequently, the length of the incarceration was changed to a
15-year minimum because the drafters recognized hypothetical circum-
stances wherein a life sentence might be extreme.
79
The Career Criminal Act may be characterized as a recidivist statute
because it imposes an increased sentence upon a repeat offender. 80 Re-
cidivism is defined as "the reversion of an individual to criminal behav-
ior after he or she has been convicted of a prior offense, sentenced, and
(presumably) corrected.' '8 1 The Second Circuit in United States v. Ber-
70. Id. 962 F.2d at 1455.
71. Id.
72. 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 596 (1991).
73. 905 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 683 (1991).
74. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 435 (1992).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). The predecessor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), became
§ 924(e) as a result of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act in 1986.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions differ-
ent from one another, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and
imprisoned not less than fifteen years ....
77. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 1989).
78. Id. at 680.
79. Id.
80. See Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute
or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1085, 1094 (1988). Courts are split on this issue.
Some characterize § 924(e) as an enhancement statute while others have held it creates a
new federal offense. Id. at 1087 n.10.
81. King, supra note 4, at 1373 n.2.
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nier 82 pointed to the specificity of the statute as proof that "when Con-
gress intends to require prior convictions as a predicate for enhanced
sentencing, it uses clear language to effectuate its intent." 83
As the bill targeted "revolving door felons," 84 the language of the
statute has been read to require intervening convictions between the
first and second conviction, as well as between the second and third
before enhancement of the fourth conviction. 85 Legislative history sup-
ported this interpretation. 86 Despite the statute's wording and the legis-
lative history, the Tenth Circuit, as well as six other circuits, interpreted
the Career Criminal Act to require only that the multiple criminal epi-
sodes be distinct in time, not that the offenses be separated by interven-
ing convictions.87
In Abreu, the Tenth Circuit defined a second or subsequent convic-
tion in the enhancement statute context to mean "commission of a sec-
ond offense after a prior conviction."' 88 The Tenth Circuit, therefore,
defined prior conviction as a conviction that is rendered prior to a sub-
sequent offense.8 9 Two months later, the Tenth Circuit, in a panel de-
cision, handed down United States v. Green.90 In Green, the court affirmed
its holdings rendered in 1990 in United States v. Bolton 9 1 and United States
v. Tisdale.9 2 In those cases 93 the Tenth Circuit held that the Career
82. 954 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 820.
84. Balascsah, 873 F.2d at 682.
85. Id.
86. A statement made by Assistant Attorney General Stephen Trott supported the
reading that intervening convictions are necessary to trigger sentence enhancement.
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their definition, that lock-
ing them up and letting them go doesn't do any good. They go on again, you
lock them up, you let them go, it doesn't do any good, they are back for a third
time. At that juncture we should say, "That's it; time out; it is all over. We, as
responsible people, will never give you the opportunity to do this again."
Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing on H. R. 1627 and S.52 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1984).
87. See United States v. Hayes, 951 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1694 (1992); United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 596 (1991); United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 683 (1991); United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101
(1989); United States v. Herbert, 860 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070
(1989); United States v. Gillies, 851 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 857 (1988);
United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988);
United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999 (11 th Cir. 1986).
88. United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 1453.
90. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1992).
91. 905 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1990).
92. 921 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1990).
93. The facts of Bolton and Tisdale are nearly identical to Green. Bolton was convicted
of four counts of armed robbery in a single judicial proceeding. Each robbery occurred at
a separate time. Bolton appealed the enhancement of his sentence for a subsequent con-
viction of possession of a firearm by a former felon. Bolton, 905 F.2d at 319. Tisdale was
convicted in a single judicial proceeding of three counts of burglary. Each burglary oc-
curred at a separate time. Tisdale appealed the enhancement of his sentence for a subse-
quent conviction of possession of a firearm by a former felon. Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1095. In
both cases, the Tenth Circuit denied the appeals and affirmed this application of
§ 924(e)(1). Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1101; Bolton, 905 F.2d at 324.
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Criminal Act only required that felonies be "committed on occasions
different from one another,"9 4 and that it did not require that the of-
fenses be separated by intervening convictions.
9 5
D. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. United States v. Green
9 6
Two months after the Abreu decision, a Tenth Circuit panel, which
included two of the three dissenting justices of Abreu, decided Green.
9 7
In Green, the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed its prior decisions that sen-
tence enhancement under the Career Criminal Act was proper even
when the requisite "three prior convictions" were the result of a single
judicial proceeding. While Abreu and Green addressed separate provi-
sions of section 924, both involved the definition of "prior conviction"
for purposes of sentence enhancement with each arriving at different
conclusions.
On July 26, 1979, in one judicial proceeding, Green was convicted
of three armed robberies occurring on separate occasions.9 8 On August
12, 1991, Green was convicted of possessing a firearm after a prior fel-
ony conviction.9 " The government filed a notice for an enhanced pen-
alty pursuant to the provisions of the Career Criminal Act. Green urged
the district court to find that the simultaneous convictions of July 26,
1979 did not meet the requirements of the Career Criminal Act.10 0 The
district court rejected Green's argument and consequently enhanced
Green's sentence.' 0 '
On appeal, Green acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit recently
held that the enhancement provision of the Career Criminal Act could
be triggered even if the three prior convictions were the result of a sin-
gle judicial proceeding, 10 2 but sought reconsideration in light of United
States v. Balascsak.10 3 In Balascsak, the Third Circuit held 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1202(a), the predecessor statute to the Career Criminal Act, re-
quired that the first conviction must have been rendered prior to the
commission of the second crime. 10 4 However, the deciding vote in
Balascsak concurred in the result, yet agreed with the dissent's analysis of
section 1202(a).10 5 The Balascsak dissent argued that Congress in-
94. Green, 967 F.2d at 461.
95. Id.
96. 967 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1992).
97. Justices Tacha and Baldock joined Justice Brorby in dissent in Abreu. Abreu, 962
F.2d at 1454. Justice Joseph T. Sneed, Circuit Justice for the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,. sitting by designation, joined in the opinion with Justices
Tacha and Brorby in Green. Green, 967 F.2d at 460.





103. 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989)(en banc), cert. denied, II1 S. Ct. 173 (1990).
104. Id. at 682.
105. Id. at 684-85 (Becker, J., concurring).
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tended section 1202(a) to apply when the convictions arose from sepa-
rate criminal episodes regardless of the date of the convictions.1 ° 6
Because the majority and dissent each received six votes, the preceden-
tial authority of Balascsak was unclear.
The Third Circuit resolved this ambiguity in United States v. School-
craft, 10 7 which held that the Career Criminal Act did not require the sep-
aration of the three predicate offenses by intervening convictions, but
rather that the criminal episodes be distinct in time.1 08 This multiple
episodes approach has been adopted by every federal court of appeals
that has considered this issue. 10 9
The Green court found the reasoning of Schoolcraft persuasive, in ad-
dition to the wording of the Career Criminal Act. Because the statute
"only requires that the felonies be 'committed on occasions different
from one another,' "1 10 it was clear that it did not require that the of-
fenses be separated by intervening convictions. Accordingly, the court
found the enhancement of Green's sentence under the Career Criminal
Act proper. 1 1' The Green panel did not mention its recent Abreu
decision.
E. Analysis
The discrepancy between Abreu and Green warrants examination. In
both cases appropriate application of enhancement provisions was at is-
sue. The Tenth Circuit determined whether Congress drafted these
statutes primarily for their deterrent effect to discourage criminals from
committing multiple crimes, regardless of prior convictions, or whether
the statutes solely targeted those who fail to reform after an initial con-
viction. If inherent in the concept of "enhancement" is the notion of
"second time through the system," then no additional statutory mention
of such intent is necessary, as suggested by the Abreu majority. Congress
offered and passed section 924(c) on the same day, hence, congressional
reports and committee reports do not exist.' 12 Consequently, the court
must resort to the "sparse pages of the floor debate"' 1 3 to interpret
legislative intent. Absence of language in these pages of opportunity to
reform can hardly be conclusive. In contrast, Congress did not offer and
pass the Career Criminal Act in one day. Congressional and committee
reports do exist offering more insight into the drafters' intent. The leg-
islative history behind the Career Criminal Act consistently referred to
"repeat offenders," "revolving door" offenders and "inability to
rehabilitate." 114
106. Id. at 685 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
107. 879 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1989).
108. Id. at 73.
109. United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing cases).
110. United States v. Green, 967 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing § 924(e)(1)).
111. Id. at 462.
112. United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992).
113. Id.
114. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 70:4
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In construing statutes, words-not specifically defined will be inter-
preted as having their ordinary, common meaning.1 5 Courts are not
devoid of their common sense when interpreting legislative intent.
Although section 924(c) is headed "Penalties," courts describe it as an
enhancement provision. 1 16 Webster's Dictionary defines "enhance" as
to "raise," "to make greater," or to "heighten." '" 7 Common sense dic-
tates that enhancement attaches to the sentence for a crime committed
after a previous conviction for a previous crime committed at a previous
time.
However, a fine line exists between a court employing its common
sense and a court interjecting terms it perceives as necessary to effectu-
ate statutes." 18 For example, the Abreu majority relied on the specific
language of other sentence enhancement statutes to assert that if limita-
tions were included there, so too must Congress have intended them to
apply to section 924(c). 119 This logic of inferring from parts of various
enhancement statutes to the whole of every enhancement statute strips
the legislature of its decision-making authority. Such logic also assumes
Congress acted carelessly in the drafting of section 924(c) and inadver-
tently left out not merely one word, but full sentences which would sig-
nificantly narrow the statute's scope. While the court "should strive to
interpret a statute in a way that will avoid an unconstitutional construc-
tion," 1 20 the court is not given a license to "rewrite language enacted by
the legislature." 12'
Therefore, the court must exercise caution in asserting its common
sense. "[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation
of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by
judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public
weal.' ",122 Courts should not speculate, much less act, on whether Con-
gress would have altered its stance,' 23 had particular situations been an-
ticipated, because "[i]f corrective action is needed, it is the Congress
that must provide it."'
12 4
The divergent circuit opinions exist due to imprecise and inconsis-
tent statutory drafting by the legislature. To assert, however, that the
legislature chose words in one statute and therefore deliberately left
those words out of a similar statute is to assume the same legislature
drafted each statute. Congress does not refer to a lexicon of statutory
language. Use of certain words is not mandatory to convey certain
115. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
116. Abreu, 963 F.2d at 1448; United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1544 (1Ith Cir.
1987).
117. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 375 (1981).
118. United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 193 (4th Cir. 1991).
119. Abreu, 963 F.2d at 1451-52.
120. Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1927 (1991).
121. Id.
122. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 410 (1980) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
195 (1978)).
123. Id. at 405.
124. Id.
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meanings. Rather, the wording of a statute hinges on the personalties of
its sponsors, purposes of the legislation, time allowed for debate, revi-
sions and amendments. Consequently, statutes enacted to effect the
same result may possess little uniformity.
Because of inept drafting, the courts of this country face the di-
lemma of either adhering to a strict construction approach or using their
judgment and common sense. A strict construction approach risks illog-
ical and unjust results in an effort to keep the doctrine of separation of
powers intact. A common sense approach may result in the nonliteral
interpretation of the language used by the legislature, thereby risking
erosion of the separation of powers. Congress's failure to clearly an-
nounce its intent results in courts balancing this equation.
The pursuit of that balance engaged these circuits in their attempts
to interpret the applicability of enhancement provisions. Not only do
there exist opposing views between circuits as to which approach should
be adopted, but within circuits as well. The Abreu majority employed
common sense and judicial discretion while the Abreu dissent and the
Green court adhered to a strict and putatively literal statutory construc-
tion approach. A better approach would require courts to enforce the
laws as written and resort to a common sense interpretation only when
clearly necessary, for example, when failure to do so would yield absurd
or illogical results.
However, it appears the Supreme Court will not decide which of
these approaches was correct. A petition for certiorari was denied in
Green on November 2, 1992.125 A petition for certiorari was filed in
Abreu onJuly 9, 1992. The petition has not been granted or denied. 126
Rather, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an identical case, United
States v. Deal,127 on due process grounds rather than based upon statu-
tory construction, and presumably will dispose of Abreu upon resolution
of Deal.128 On October 21, 1992, the Federal Public Defender's Office
filed a supplemental memorandum in hopes of consolidating Abreu with
Deal. 129
125. 113 S. Ct. 435 (1992).
126. The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari as to Thornbrugh's convic-
tions. United States v. Thornbrugh, No. 92-5053, 1992 WL 171156 (U.S. Oct 5, 1992).
127. 954 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. (1992). Deal was charged and
convicted in a single judicial proceeding of six counts of bank robbery, six violations of
§ 9 2 4(c) and one violation of § 92 2 (g). Id. The trial court held the six separate convictions
of § 924(c) triggered the enhancement provisions of that section, thereby resulting in a
consecutive sentence amounting to 105 years. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the second or subsequent conviction language provided for enhanced penalties for a crime
of violence even if charged in the same indictment as the first. Id. at 263.
128. Telephone interview with Vicki Mandell-King, Asst. Federal Public Defender for
the Districts of Colorado and Wyoming (Nov. 18, 1992).
129. Id. The supplemental memorandum was filed pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 15.7, 28
U.S.C.A. § 15.7 (Supp. 1992).
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III. TESTING THE SCOPE OF BOSTICK AS APPLIED TO POLICE-PASSENGER
ENCOUNTERS ON TRAINS
A. Background
Discussion concerning the constitutionality of police field interroga-
tion - police authority to stop, question, and frisk suspicious persons
who cannot be arrested - first appeared in 1960.130 The Supreme
Court issued landmark opinions on police field interrogation in Terry v.
Ohio,13 1 and Sibron v. New York.' 3 2 At the time these cases were decided,
the exclusionary rule' 33 was the most frequently invoked remedy to con-
trol and limit police activities. 134 Once the Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule to the states in 1961,135 it became important to more
precisely define what constituted a seizure that required probable cause.
The Terry Court recognized that not all interaction between police
officers and citizens involved seizures. "Only when the officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."' 13 6 In
Terry and its companion cases, the Supreme Court attempted to further
define acceptable police practices 137 by categorizing police-citizen en-
counters as falling into one of three types: (1) voluntary encounters-
"nonseizures," which require no evidentiary predicate at all, and there-
fore, do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative deten-
130. Frank J. Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCIENCE 386 (1960).
131. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
132. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Sibron was a consolidation of two cases, the other being Peters
v. New York.
133. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by, Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960) on other grounds.
134. However, its function was, and still is, limited. Courts only invoke the exclusion-
ary rule 1) if the illegally obtained evidence is needed for conviction; and 2) if an appro-
priate motion is made at the appropriate time. The state may indirectly use illegally
obtained evidence, for example, for impeachment purposes. A major flaw of the exclu-
sionary rule is that it is geared solely toward conviction and fails to account for the fact that
police illegality is still utilized in the bargaining process. Lawrence P. Tiffany, The Fourth
Amendment and Police-Citizen Confrontations, 60 J. CRIM L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE
442, 452 (1969).
135. The Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to the state courts in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
136. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
137. Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1988). Terry was not
the first occasion the Supreme Court had to address this question. In Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), the Court had to determine the legality of a seizure. Two
police officers approached a cab stopped at a light driven by Rios. Id. at 256. The issue
was whether an arrest occurred when the officers took their positions at the doors of the
cab, which would have been illegal; or whether the arrest took place after one of the of-
ficers saw the defendant drop what turned out to be narcotics to the floor of the cab. Id. at
262. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine when the arrest oc-
curred, but provided no significant guidelines, nor addressed the question of whether po-
lice officers may properly detain individuals for questioning without reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 262. The state court avoided these issues as well, determining that the officers'
actions were justified as part of routine interrogation. Rios v United States, 192 F. Supp.
888, (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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tions - seizures which must be supported by reasonable suspicion, an
evidentiary requirement less than probable cause; and (3) arrests, which
must be supported by probable cause.13 8
Analyzing search and seizure cases with three questions in mind
proves helpful. The first question asks whether the police seized the
suspect, and if so, whether the seizure occurred lawfully. The second
question asks whether the search occurred lawfully. The third question
addresses consent. The only circumstance under which evidence ob-
tained from an unlawful search may be admissible'is if the suspect volun-
tarily consented to the search of his person or belongings. In order for
consent to be voluntary, it must be sufficiently attenuated from any ille-
gal detention. 139 Answers to these questions can only be derived from
an examination of the totality of the circumstances of each case.
In Terry, a police officer observed Terry and another man, Chilton,
repeatedly walking back and forth in front of a store window. 140 The
officer, suspecting the men of "casing a job, a stick-up," confronted the
men. The officer frisked Terry and found a gun. Defense counsel
moved to suppress the weapon. In an 8-1 decision,' 4 1 the Court af-
firmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The Court held the officer
had reasonable grounds to support his belief that the two men acted
suspiciously and that they might be armed, thereby justifying the pat-
down search. 1
42
The Court drew a distinction between an investigatory stop and an
arrest. An arrest required probable cause to believe a crime had been
committed and that the suspect committed it. An investigatory stop re-
quired "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."1 4 3 The
Court also distinguished between a "frisk" and a full-blown search. The
Court held an officer may frisk a suspect for dangerous weapons if the
officer has evidence that reasonably lead him to believe that the suspect
is armed and dangerous.14 4 In contrast, a full-blown search is justified
only by probable cause.
Because the officer physically seized Terry almost immediately, the
Court did not need to address at what point a seizure took place.' 4 5
The scope of Terry was narrow. It held only that when an officer investi-
gates a suspicious person, the officer may frisk that person for danger-
138. See United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1255 (1984).
139. United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 958 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 230
(1991). In 1975, the Supreme Court identified the factors to consider in determining
whether voluntary consent exists. A reviewing court must look at 1) the closeness in time
between the illegal detention and the "consent;" 2) the existence of intervening circum-
stances; and 3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968).
141. Id. (Justice Douglas dissented).
142. Id. at 30-31.
143. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 30.
145. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 437 n.4.
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ous weapons if the officer has evidence that reasonably leads him to
believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.14 6 Consequently, the
Terry Court left undefined the precise contours of an arrest, a non-
seizure and an investigatory detention.
The scope of Sibron14 7 was equally narrow. In Sibron, a police of-
ficer observed defendant Sibron over an eight-hour period in conversa-
tion with people known to the officer as narcotic addicts.14 8 The officer
observed Sibron speaking with three more known addicts that evening
inside a restaurant. 14 9 The officer approached him and told him to
come outside. Outside, the officer said to Sibron, "You know what I am
after."' 150 The officer testified Sibron "mumbled something and
reached into his pocket."' 5 ' Simultaneously, the officer thrust his hand
into the same pocket and discovered several glassine envelopes, which
were later determined to contain heroin.' 52 The trial court held the of-
ficer had probable cause to arrest Sibron.153 Accordingly, it held that
the search was properly incident to that arrest.1 54 The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed without opinion.
15 5
The Supreme Court, in five opinions, 15 6 reversed Sibron's convic-
tion. Chief Justice Warren, writing the majority, defined the frisk of
Sibron as the intrusion that had to be justified as the record was unclear
whether Sibron had been seized prior to the search. 15 7 The Court
found no elements of a self-protective search and therefore, concluded
that the intrusion was unconstitutional. 158
In Terry and Sibron the Court refused to address the issue of whether
the initial confrontations involved restraint. In Terry, the Court stated:
"We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety
of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes
of 'detention' and/or interrogation."' 159 Similarly, in Sibron the Court
stated: "We are not called Upon to decide in this case whether there was
a 'seizure' of Sibron inside the restaurant antecedent to the physical
seizure which accompanied the search."' 160 The Court acknowledged it
146. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
147. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).





153. Id. at 47.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Justices Brennan, White, Stewart and Marshall concurred with ChiefJustice War-
ren's majority opinion. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 40. Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion,
seemed to agree with the approach of the majority. Id. at 68. Justice Harlan reiterated the
analysis he advocated in Terry. Id. at 70. Justice Fortas would have given more weight to the
confession of error. Id. at 70. Finally, Justice Black dissented on the ground that the police
action was taken in reasonable self-defense. Id. at 70, 79.
157. Id. at 60 n.20.
158. Id at 66-67.
159. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
160. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63.
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is not necessary for a suspect to be taken to the station house before a
seizure has occurred, however, it gave no guidelines for determining
when a seizure has taken place, outside the undefined "show of
authority." 1
6'
In the decade following Terry, courts focused' on clarifying the defi-
nition of "investigatory detentions." Not until the early 1980s did the
"nonseizure" category-supposed "voluntary encounters'-the focus
of this analysis, receive further scrutiny.
16 2
The two cases which gave rise to the test currently employed by
courts to determine whether a police-citizen encounter constituted a
"nonseizure" are United States v. Mendenhall163 and Florida v. Royer. 164 In
Mendenhall, Drug Enforcement agents believed Mendenhall's behavior in
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport was characteristic of a drug trafficker.
The agents approached her, identified themselves and asked to see her
driver's license and airline ticket.' 65 After discovering a discrepancy be-
tween the names listed on the two items and observing Mendenhall's
increased nervousness, the agents asked Mendenhall to accompany
them to the DEA office for further questions. 16 6 There, Mendenhall
agreed to a search of her person and handbag despite being told she
could refuse such a search. The search resulted in the discovery of her-
oin and the agents arrested Mendenhall.
16 7
Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, focused on whether Men-
denhall had been seized when approached by the agents and asked ques-
tions. 6 8 In answering this question, Justice Stewart followed the view
expressed in Terry that a person is "seized" only when his freedom of
movement is restrained by means of physical force or a show of author-
ity. 16 9 Thus, Justice Stewart held "that a person has been 'seized' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have be-
lieved that he was not free to leave."'170 Justice Stewart concluded that
"nothing in the record suggests that the respondent had any objective
reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the
concourse and proceed on her way, and for that reason we conclude that
the agents' initial approach to her was not a seizure."'
171
Justice Powell concurred with the result, but found that a seizure
based on reasonable suspicion occurred. 17 2 While he did not disagree
with the "walk away" standard put forth by justice Stewart, he felt it was
161. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
162. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 437-38.
163. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
164. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
165. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48.
166. Id. at 548.
167. Id. at 549.
168. Id. at 551-52.
169. Id. at 553.
170. Id. at 554.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
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a close call as to whether Mendenhall was free to walk away. 173 Justice
White, dissenting, assumed as well a seizure occurred, and disagreed
with the standard suggested by Stewart.174 The three differing views in
the Mendenhall opinion created uncertainty among lower courts as to the
standard for determining whether a seizure took place.175 Three years
later, the Supreme Court addressed this uncertainty in Florida v.
Royer. 1
76
In Royer, Justice White, writing for the four justice plurality, ad-
hered to the "free to leave" test of Mendenhall.177 Yet, the Court
reached the opposite result with facts virtually identical to Mendenhall.
Royer, like Mendenhall, fit a drug courier profile.1 78 Royer produced a
driver's license and airline ticket bearing different names, and became
noticeably more nervous as the conversation with the government
agents progressed. 17 9 The agents did not return Royer's license or
ticket, but asked him to accompany them to a flight attendant's
lounge. 180 Royer's luggage was brought to the room without Royer's
consent. When requested, Royer produced a key to one suitcase and
allowed the officers to pry open the other suitcase. The agents found
marijuana and arrested Royer. 181
The court ruled the search of the luggage was unlawful because at
that time, Royer "as a practical matter" was under arrest' 8 2 and prob-
able cause did not exist to justify such an arrest.183 Paramount to this
determination was the fact the agents retained Royer's ticket and
driver's license without indicating in any way he was free to depart.'
8 4
While tenuous to hinge the different outcomes of Mendenhall and Royer
on whether identification was returned, this one fact further supported
the Court's "free to leave" analysis.
185
173. Id. at n.l.
174. Id. at 569-71 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 447.
176. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
177. Id. at 503-04 n.9.
178. Id. at 493.
179. Id. at 494.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 494-95.
182. Id. at 501.
183. Id. at 507.
184. Id. at 503-04 n.9.
185. The next Supreme Court decision that addressed the issue of when a seizure oc-
curs was I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). In that case, the practice of immigration
officers in conducting surveys of factories in search of illegal aliens was challenged.
Agents approached employees, asked questions and, in some cases, requested immigra-
tion papers. The Ninth Circuit applied the Mendenhall test to conclude that the entire work
force had been seized because a reasonable worker "would have believed he was not free
to leave." The Supreme Court reversed, citing the language of Royer that "interrogation
relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself,
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." The Court felt the employees could not have
possessed a reasonable fear that they were not free to continue working or move about the
factory. Delgado, with its unusual setting of a factory, added little in the way of clarification
to the murky doctrine of "nonseizures." Id.
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In 1991, the Supreme Court in Florida v. Bostick 186 interpreted the
Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test to include the concept of "free to
terminate the encounter."1 8 7 At issue in that case was the constitution-
ality of random bus searches. In an effort to curtail drug traffic, Broward
County Sheriff's Department officers routinely boarded buses and, with-
out articulable suspicion, asked passengers for permission to search
their luggage.18 8 Bostick, after being advised of his right to refuse, con-
sented to such a search. After finding cocaine, the officers arrested Bos-
tick.' 8 9 The trial court denied his motion to suppress the cocaine. The
Florida Court of Appeals affirmed, but certified a question to the Florida
Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of such random bus
searches. 190
The Florida Supreme Court, citing the Mendenhall-Royer test, held
that a reasonable passenger would not feel free to leave the bus to avoid
questioning by the police, and adopted a per se rule that such "working
the buses" was unconstitutional.' 9' The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine whether this per se rule is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court held the "free to leave" analysis inapplicable to
the setting of a bus because Bostick's freedom of movement was re-
stricted not because of police conduct, but because he chose to be a
passenger on a bus. 19 2 Consequently, the appropriate inquiry "is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' re-
quests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' 9 3 At issue then, was
whether such a police-citizen encounter on a bus constituted an investi-
gatory detention first identified in Terry.
The Court recognized that a seizure does not occur merely because
a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. Such
an encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection unless it
loses its consensual nature. 194 In addition, police officers may request
consent to search luggage as long as they do not convey the message
that compliance with their request is mandatory. 195
The Court pointed out-that the trial court did not evaluate all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether a
seizure occurred, but rather based its finding solely on the fact the en-
counter took place on a bus. 19 6 The location of the encounter is one
factor for consideration, but the trial court erred in making it the only
186. Ill S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
187. Id. at 2387.
188. Id. at 2384.
189. Id. at 2384-85.
190. Id. at 2385.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2387.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2386.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2388.
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relevant factor.' 9 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded so the
Florida court could properly evaluate the seizure question. 19 8
The Bostick dissent took issue with the majority's authorization of
police questioning of citizens without particularized suspicion, which it
viewed as a violation of the core values of the Fourth Amendment. 19 9
Judge Marshall, speaking for the dissent, characterized such "random
indiscriminate stopping and questioning of individuals ' 20 0 as "inconve-
nient, intrusive, and intimidating."'2 0 1 The'dissent argued if the Court
allowed these types of confrontations, so too will it allow "random
knocks on the doors of our citizens' homes seeking 'consent' to search
for drugs." 2 0 2 The dissent agreed with the majority's test, but failed to
understand how Bostick could have felt free to decline the officers'
requests.
20 3
The dissent argued Bostick had no reasonable alternative to coop-
erating with the officers. 20 4 Had Bostick refused to answer questions,
he would have aroused the officers' suspicions. In addition, leaving the
bus at an intermediate point in a long bus journey20 5 and abandoning
his belongings in the process was not a feasible option. 20 6 The dissent
concluded by emphasizing police may approach passengers whom they
have reason to suspect of criminal wrongdoing. 20 7 In addition, police
may confront passengers without suspicion "so long as they took simple
steps, like advising the passengers confronted of their right to decline to
be questioned, to dispel the aura of coercion and intimidation that per-
vades such encounters."'20 8 As the encounter with Bostick did not fall
within one of these two acceptable categories, the dissent found the en-
counter illegal.
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. United States v. Ward20 9
a. Background
In Ward, the Albuquerque Police Department received information
concerning an Amtrack train passenger, Ward. The information re-
197. Id. at 2389.
198. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court found that defendant's consent to search
his luggage was voluntary, and affirmed the conviction. Bostick v. State, 593 So. 2d 494
(Fla. 1992).
199. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens joined Justice Marshall in dissent. Id.
200. Id. at 2391 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (D.D.C.),
rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
201. Id. at 2390 (quoting United States v. Chandler, 744 F. Supp. 333, 335 (D.D.C.
1990)).
202. Id. at 2391 (quoting Lewis, 728 F. Supp. at 788-89).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2392-94.
205. Id. at 2393.
206. Id. at 2393-94.
207. Id. at 2394.
208. Id. at 2394-95.
209. 961 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992).
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vealed that the passenger had paid $600 in cash for a one-way ticket
from Flagstaff, Arizona to Kansas City, Missouri; the call-back number
given by the passenger originated in Tucson, a known drug origination
point; and that the passenger reserved the largest private room on the
train.2 10 Detective Erekson and Agent Small met the train when it ar-
rived in Albuquerque. The officers boarded the train and knocked on
the door to the train sleeper car occupied by Ward. Ward opened the
door and the detective leaned inside the compartment and asked Ward
for permission to talk to him and to enter the compartment. 2 1 1 Ward
granted both requests.
The detective sat down between Ward and the door. The detective
questioned Ward about his luggage and identification. 2 12 Ward stated
that his only luggage was a shoulder bag, which he allowed the detective
to examine.2 13 Discovering a discrepancy between the names listed on
Ward's ticket and his driver's license further aroused the detective's
suspicion.
While these events took place between Ward and the detective, the
agent discovered that Ward had boarded the train with two suitcases.
The agent informed the detective of this fact.2 14 The detective asked
Ward if he possessed keys to the luggage. Ward consented to a search
of his pockets which uncovered a key to the luggage. Ward subse-
quently produced three more keys, further tying Ward to the luggage
despite the fact that he subsequently disclaimed ownership of the lug-
gage.2 15 These keys opened the luggage, the search of which led to the
discovery of 41 pounds of marijuana and the arrest of Ward.
2 16
The trial court denied Ward's motion to suppress the marijuana.
Ward entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of narcotics and
subsequently appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.2 1 7 The
Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding the
seizure and subsequent search of Ward's luggage was unlawful.
218
b. Opinion of the Court
The court began by finding the initial information the officers pos-
sessed concerning Ward consistent with the concept of innocent travel.
Consequently, that information was insufficient to provide the officers
with a reasonable suspicion on which to base an investigatory deten-
tion. 21 9 However, the court did find the officers had reasonable suspi-
cion to detain Ward upon learning of the discrepancies concerning the
210. Id. at 1529.
211. Id. at 1530.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1529-30.
214. Id. at 1530.
215. Id. at 1535.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1528.
218. Id. at 1536.
219. Id. at 1529.
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identification and luggage.2 20 Still, the search of Ward's luggage was
illegal unless it could be determined Ward voluntarily consented to the
questioning and subsequent search of his luggage. The court therefore
defined the issue as whether the encounter between Ward and the of-
ficers was consensual.
22 1
As the Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test is inapplicable to the
setting of a train, 2 22 the court employed the test handed down by the
Supreme Court in Bostick: "[W]hether a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encoun-
ter." 223 Noting the small size and frail condition of Ward, 224 the pres-
ence of two officers, with one officer seated between Ward and the door,
and the fact the interrogation of Ward took place in a small roomette
outside the view of other passengers, the court concluded that a reason-
able person in Ward's position would have felt unable to decline the
requests of the officers or terminate the encounter. 22 5 In addition, the
officers did not make simple, general inquiries of Ward, but asked fo-
cused, potentially incriminating questions. As this form of questioning
implied the investigation has focused specifically on the individual, that
individual will feel less able to terminate the encounter.2 26
The court also distinguished Bostick from the instant case in that the
officers in Bostick specifically advised Bostick of his right to terminate the
encounter. 22 7 The officers gave no such advisement to Ward. Although
such failure to advise is not determinative of whether a seizure took
place, it should be afforded greater weight in light of the fact the en-
counter with Ward took place in a nonpublic setting.2 28 Based on a to-
tality of these circumstances, the court concluded Ward had been
unlawfully seized at the point the officer first began asking Ward incrimi-
nating questions.
2 29
Next, the court addressed the question of whether Ward voluntarily
consented to a search of his pockets, which produced the first luggage
key. The court pointed out that in order for the consent to be deemed
voluntary, it must be sufficiently attenuated in time from the illegal de-
tention.23 0 Noting that Ward's consent to a search of his pockets oc-
curred only minutes after the illegal seizure began, the court found no
intervening circumstances which attenuated the two. 2 3 1 Accordingly,
the court held Ward's consent to the search of his pockets was tainted by
220. Id. at 1530.
221. Id.
222. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387-88 (1991).
223. Id. at 2387.
224. At the time, Ward was 5'7, weighed 145 pounds and had recently undergone a
kidney transplant. Ward, 961 F.2d at 1533.
225. Id. at 1531-33.
226. Id. at 1532.
227. Id. at 1533.
228. Id.
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the prior illegal seizure, rendering the marijuana the fruit of such illegal
seizure.
2 32
The court applied the same analysis to determine whether Ward
voluntarily disclaimed ownership of the bag. Like consent to search,
when abandonment is preceded by an illegal seizure, the abandonment
is only valid if sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure. 23 3 As the
Government failed to prove such attenuation, the court found Ward's
disclaimers of ownership tainted by the illegal seizure.23 4 Accordingly,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of Ward's motion to suppress, and
remanded for consistent further proceedings.
Two months after Ward, the Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished opin-
ion, decided a similar case, United States v. Arendondo.23 5 The totality of
the circumstances, however, led the Tenth Circuit to affirm Arendondo's
conviction for possession of drugs, as contrasted with Ward. A compari-
son of these two cases illustrates the Tenth Circuit's commitment to de-
ciding search and seizure cases based solely on the totality of the
circumstances.
C. Analysis
The Supreme Court's lack of clarity in the realm of search and
seizure allows the lower courts considerable leeway to decide when a
seizure occurred. Whether a seizure has occurred should be determined
by a realistic examination of the facts in each case. Rather than relying
on the fact-specific "totality of the circumstances" test, many courts still
apply the unrealistic Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test.2 3 6 Courts ap-
pear comfortable applying a modified Mendenhall-Royer test to the search
and seizure context.2 3 7 However" a lack of uniformity in the "modified"
versions adopted by the courts has resulted in inconsistent treatment of
similar cases.
For example, encounters between police and suspected drug smug-
glers in airports are uniform, 23 8 yet determining at what point a seizure,
if any, has occurred, is analyzed differently by different courts.23 9 Some
courts find the entire encounter illegal, as the officer lacked sufficient
reasonable suspicion. Other courts find the encounter consensual,
232. Id. at 1535.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1535-36.
235. No. 91-2103, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14654 (10th Cir.June 17, 1992). Tenth Cir-
cuit Rule 36.3 states that unpublished opinions and orders and judgments have no prece-
dential value and shall not be cited except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the
law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel.
236. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 463.
237. Id.
238. Agents develop a suspicion of a passenger usually arriving on a flight from a
source city. Id at 457. The agents follow the suspect, approach, identify themselves and
ask if the suspect will talk with them. Then the agents ask to see the suspect's ticket and
identification. At this point the agents either ask the suspect to accompany them to an
office for further questioning or ask for consent to search their luggage. If consent is given
and drugs are found, the suspect is arrested. Id. at 457-58.
239. Id. at 458.
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-therefore, no seizure occurred. Often courts find a seizure which isjus-
tified by the requisite level of suspicion, and hence is legal. 240
Almost all courts agree that officers merely approaching individuals,
requesting to speak with them, and asking for identification does not
constitute a seizure. 241 Many courts find a seizure has occurred at some
point in the encounter, but hold different views as to when that seizure
took place. These points vary from retention of the passenger's ticket
and identification, 2 4 2 the officer informing the individual of his suspi-
cions, 2 43 asking the individual a question designed to confirm or dispel
suspicion, 24 4 the officer asking the individual to accompany him to an-
other location, 245 requesting permission to search2 46 and threatening to
seek a search warrant. 24 7 The result of these inconsistent applications
of the Mendenhall-Royer test is the varied treatment of essentially identical
situations.
The lack of bright-line rules provided by the Supreme Court as to
when a seizure has taken place results in fewer restrictions placed upon
police conduct.2 4 8 In 1969, Professor Tiffany suggested one result of
Terry's ambiguity may be increased judicial intervention to control police
practices if the relevant policing agencies do not undertake to do it
themselves. 24 9 However, judicial intervention since Terry has done little
to clarify this area of law. In the twenty-four years since Terry, the
Supreme Court has handed down Mendenhall, Royer and Bostick providing
the ambiguous "reasonable person," "free to leave" and "free to termi-
nate the encounter" tests. Courts have difficulty interpreting these tests
and policing agencies show increasing tendencies to exploit rather than
help clarify the ambiguity. Hard to apply, difficult to define tests do lit-
tle to clarify search and seizure doctrine.
Professor Butterfoss pointed out the Mendenhall-Royer test may not
even be true to the principles of Terry.2 50 Terry held that "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person." 2 5 1 The Terry court emphasized this
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983) (seizure occurred
when officer held license while making additional requests).
243. United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986) (seizure occurred when
officer retained suspect's drivers license).
244. United States v. Gallego-Zapata, 630 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1986) (seizure oc-
curred when officers identified themselves and asked defendant from where he came).
245. United States v. Lehmann, 798 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1986) (no seizure until agents
asked defendant in airport parking lot to accompany them to F.A.A. office).
246. United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1988) (encounter became
seizure when federal agent told suspect he was a narcotics officer and requested permis-
sion to look in suspect's bag), over-ruled by, U.S. v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990).
247. United States v. Pirelli, 650 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mass. 1986) (consensual encounter
became seizure when officers threatened to obtain search warrant unless suspect con-
sented to search).
248. See Tiffany, supra note 132, at 453.
249. Id.
250. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 480.
251. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
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determination can only be made "in light of the particular circum-
stances." 2 52 Justice Stewart in Mendenhal converted the Terry detention
test to a "reasonable person" 2 53 test, placing more emphasis on that
unrealistic subjective standard rather than the necessary objective stan-
dard of focusing on the particular circumstances.
Viewed in this light, it appears the Tenth Circuit in Ward, while it
may have modified Mendenhall-Royer" remained true to Terry. In Ward,
the court tested "the limits of Bostick in an encounter in a small private
compartment of a train."' 2 54 However, examination of Ward has shown
that the fact the encounter took place on a train was but one element
factored into the real questions posed by Ward. The first question asked
if Ward was detained, and if so, whether that detention was legal. The
second question asked, regardless of the legality of the detention,
whether Ward voluntarily consented to the search of his pockets and
luggage. As these are the principle questions addressed in every search
and seizure case, Ward, while it may add a twist in that it occurred on a
train, is no different.
In deciding whether Ward had been detained, the Tenth Circuit
placed great emphasis on the fact Ward was subjected to potentially in-
criminating questioning, but did not base its decision on that fact
alone. 2 55 Rather, that fact, when combined with the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" 2 56 gave rise to the illegal detention. That Ward does not
stand for a per se rule prohibiting the asking of train passengers poten-
tially incriminating questions is evidenced by the unpublished opinion
the Tenth Circuit handed down two months after Ward, in United States v.
Arendondo.
25 7
In Arendondo, the same DEA agent involved in Ward, Agent Small,25 8
boarded an Amtrack train in Albuquerque. Unlike the situation in Ward,
Agent Small did not act pursuant to a tip. Agent Small's attention was
drawn to Arendondo when he saw Arendondo, who did not appear
handicapped, sitting in the handicapped section of the train.25 9 Agent
Small approached Arendondo, displayed his badge and asked to speak
to him. Arendondo agreed. 260  Agent Small next asked to see
252. Id. at 21.
253. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 480.
254. United States v. Ward, 961 F.2d 1526, 1528 (10th Cir. 1992).
255. Id. at 1532, 1534. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has held that asking incriminating
questions absent reasonable suspicion renders a detention illegal in the setting of routine
traffic stops. In United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), an officer
stopped the defendant for not wearing a seat belt. The court ruled the officer lacked rea-
sonable suspicion to detain and question the defendant further outside the purpose of the
stop. The Tenth Circuit followed this opinion three years later in United States v. Walker,
941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1168 (1991).
256. Ward, 961 F.2d at 1534.
257. No. 91-2103, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14654 (10th Cir. June 17, 1992).
258. Agent Small was involved in yet another train case in 1992. See United States v.
Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit did not materially distinguish
Bloom from Ward, and applied Ward to reverse the district court's denial of the motion to
suppress. Id.




Arendondo's ticket, which Arendondo produced, and Arendondo's
identification, which Arendondo said he did not have. At this point
Agent Small informed Arendondo he "was a DEA agent who daily
boarded the train looking for people traveling alone and carrying nar-
cotics." '2 6 1 Arendondo replied he did not have any drugs. Agent Small
then asked for permission to search Arendondo's luggage "to make sure
they don't contain any drugs."12 6 2 Arendondo consented, the search un-
covered drugs, and Arendondo was arrested.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Arendondo. The
Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Ward because the agents
questioned Ward in "physically intimidating surroundings" as com-
pared to the fact Arendondo was questioned in "an open public car
immediately in front of an exit."' 263 In addition, two officers questioned
Ward while one questioned Arendondo. Moreover, the court noted
physical size greatly favored Arendondo, whereas Ward was
diminutive.
26 4
Ward, when read in conjunction with Arendondo, can be viewed not
so much as registering dissent to the holding of Bostick, but as register-
ing dissent to the application of unrealistic tests, like Mendenhall-Royer.
Cases cannot be decided based solely on the location of the encounter,
or on what an artificial "reasonable person," who is much more assertive
than the average citizen,26 5 might feel. Rather, courts must base their
decisions solely on the "concrete factual context of the individual
case. ' 266 Courts must examine whether the encounter involved aggres-
sion, authoritative commands or blockage of passage.2 6 7 Courts should
look to whether the officer visibly displayed his weapons or physically
intimidated or threatened the suspect.2 68 Also relevant is whether the
encounter took place at an unusual time or place.2 69 No single factor
may be dispositive of whether a seizure has occurred implicating the
Fourth Amendment; rather, it depends on the totality of all the circum-
stances surrounding the incident.
2 70
While the Supreme Court received much criticism for its imprecise
tests, no alternative exists. If each case is truly to be decided on the
basis of assessing the "coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a
whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isola-
261. Id. at *3.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *8 n.8.
264. Id.
265. Butterfoss, supra note 135, at 439. The reality is citizens virtually never feel free to
walk away when approached by a police officer. Id.
266. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).
267. Cf Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988) (police presence alone does
not constitute seizure).
268. Cf United States v. Brady, 842 F.2d 1313, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (defendant faced
none of the factors typically found to intimidate persons into thinking compliance is
obligatory).
269. Id.
270. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572.
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tion,"2 7 1 the test must be imprecise to accommodate varying facts.
Search and seizure doctrine became more unclear when the Supreme
Court adopted the unrealistic "reasonable person free to leave or termi-
nate the encounter" test. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit has consistently
adhered to examining the seizure "in light of the particular circum-
stances" 2 72 and in that sense, has remained true to Terry.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated indepen-
dence in the areas of sentence enhancement and search and seizure. In
Abreu, the Tenth Circuit rejected the reasoning adhered to by six other
circuits as to the applicability of a sentence enhancement provision.
However, because of the apparent inconsistency between Abreu and
Green, the Tenth Circuit's sentence enhancement doctrine remains un-
clear. In Ward, the Tenth Circuit registered its dissent to the unrealistic
Mendenhall-Royer test and reasserted the importance of deciding search
and seizure cases based on the totality of the circumstances. In so do-
ing, the Tenth Circuit refused to extend the Supreme Court's holding in
Bostick to the setting of private train compartments. It will be interesting
to see if the Supreme Court finds it necessary to harness the indepen-
dence demonstrated by the Tenth Circuit in 1992.
Martha A. Paluch
271. Id. at 573.
272. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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